Appalachian Automated Launch System

The Appalachian Automated Launch System refers to the network of three nuclear silos built in Appalachia before the Great War, intended to provide the United States with a reliable second-strike option in case of a nuclear attack. The system consists of three missile silos spread across the Appalachians (Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie), controlled from the command center at The Whitespring Bunker.

Background
The construction of an automated network of silos in Appalachia was opposed by Senator Sam Blackwell, who raised objections to the discrepancies between military and civilian warning systems. He was threatened with imprisonment for sowing dissension and inciting panic.

The silos were designed to be used with a minimum of human oversight, with one exception: Launching nuclear weapons. The system relied on single-use nuclear keycards, which were delivered through logistics officers and automated Strategic Air Command cargobot deliveries to the region. To authorize a nuclear strike, the keycard was just the first step. The general ordering the launch also had to input the correct launch code. To prevent misuse of Appalachia's automated missile silos, security measures for the region's nuclear arsenal were complex. Each silo had its own eight-digit launch code, which was valid for a single week. These codes were broken into eight individual number/letter pairs, each carried by a designated officer who was under strict orders to guard their code piece with their life. The order of the numbers was encrypted using a series of methods to prevent improper deployment. It was the job of The Whitespring Bunker's staff of specially trained code-decrypters to provide the officer corps with the code when it was renewed each week.

The silos themselves were designed to launch nuclear weapons, and equipped with an advanced robotic construction system, allowing them to rapidly refill their arsenals in a matter of hours. The silos were also defended by a robotic task force and staffed with a contingent of special-clearance human missileers. Security protocols required all silo entrants, regardless of rank, to be escorted by a missileer at all times. Entering a silo without an escort would be treated as a hostile act regardless of rank. Moreover, the military specialists in charge of the silo, the aforementioned missileers, were rotated every six months. They were the only ones permitted inside the maximum-security Class VI sites. Everyone else, with the sole exception of Generals, with a preauthorized missileer escort, would be shot on sight.

Due to the sophistication and purpose of the system, the military was aware that a retaliatory strike could touch down somewhere in Appalachia. During the Great War, no retaliatory strike landed in Appalachia and the missile silos never fired their payloads. In Silo Alpha, the general responsible for authorizing the nuclear keycard made a mistake when inputting the code, losing the only nuclear keycard assigned to the silo. The soldiers were ordered to evacuate at 0600 the following day, with the missileers hoping the incompetent general would be court-martialed. At Bravo, the general never arrived, with the missileers abandoning the site. Only a single private, Jeffers, stayed behind. Site Charlie was evacuated due to a radiation leak from the missiles.

Gallery

 * Command center (Whitespring)